Tumescent Terminus PTCA PK et al 11.11.2016 @11.11

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Tumescent Terminus PTCA PK et al 11.11.2016 @

11.11

Ambulance doors open.

She’s arrived.

Somewhere.

Expectancy heightens the ‘imminent’.

With no dissent she is lowered down from the ambulance put on a stretcher and wheeled down a corridor.

‘You’re ok’ said the ambulance man pushing fast.

What? she thinks

A face appears above hers, eyes brown and intense he’s  telling her she needs to sign a form, a disclaimer in case she bleeds to death, has a stroke, a h……..her mind which had been compliant and silent is now in overload: too much assiduity and action.

‘What go away’ she thinks

What is he on about?

She hates being centre of attention and mostly she hates Continue reading “Tumescent Terminus PTCA PK et al 11.11.2016 @11.11”

he is all seeing Oedipus fulfilling the oracle

Kavka’s original version of the puzzle is the following:

An eccentric billionaire places before you a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects. The billionaire will pay you one million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the money will already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it arrives, if you succeed. All you have to do. . . intend at midnight tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are perfectly free to change your mind after receiving the money and not drink the toxin.[1]

A possible interpretation: Can you intend to drink the toxin if you also intend to change your mind at a later time?

  • In line with Newcomb’s paradox, an omniscient pay-off mechanism makes a person’s decision known to him before he makes the decision, but it is also assumed that the person may change his decision afterwards, of free will.
  • Similarly in line with Newcomb’s paradox; Kavka’s claim, that one cannot intend what one will not do, makes pay-off mechanism an example of reverse causation.
  • Pay-off for decision to drink the poison is ambiguous.
  • There are two decisions for one event with different pay-offs.

Since the pain caused by the poison would be more than off-set by the money received, we can sketch the pay-off table as follows.

pulled into his underworld

Newcomb’s paradox

In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb’s paradox, also referred to as Newcomb’s problem, is a thought experiment involving a game between two players, one of whom purports to be able to predict the future. Whether the problem actually is a paradox is disputed.

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